Analysis and Evaluation of Victorian Reform in General Damages for Personal Injury under the Tort of Negligence by Chu, John
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF 
VICTORIAN REFORM IN GENERAL 
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
UNDER THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
 
JOHN CHU* 
 
 
[This article examines the current legislative structures in 
Victoria for compensating non-economic losses for personal 
injuries under the tort of negligence. It first provides a 
background on the tort of negligence in general and damages 
for non-economic losses in particular. It then outlines the 
changes that have swept through Victoria and in the rest of 
Australia for comparative purposes. This article offers a 
critique of the rationale and justification for those changes, 
analyses the implications of the changes at both Victorian and 
Commonwealth levels across the public, professional and 
product liability areas, and concludes with a discussion of the 
overall effect of the Victorian reforms.]  
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Of all the matters into which the Review of the Law of Negligence (‘Ipp 
Panel’) was requested to inquire… the principles governing the award of 
damages arising from personal injury and death was… most critical. It is 
reform of that area of law which is liable to have the most significant affect 
on our day to day lives and on the community at large.1 
 
                                                 
* B Info Sys, B Bus (Bkg & Fin), MBA (Monash), CPA, CMC, JD Candidate, 
Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne.  
1 Nicholas J Mullany, 'Tort Reform and the Damages Dilemma' (2002) 25(3) UNSW 
Law Journal 876, 876. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                             VOLUME 10 NO 2 126
It is obvious that not everything can be contracted in advance when it comes 
to human interactions. As such the tort of negligence provides an important 
legal framework to help safeguard an individual’s personal safety in the 
course of everyday life, in the absence of deliberate acts committed by a 
person to inflict injuries on another. 
 
One of the, if not the, most challenging and contentious area in the law of 
negligence is the assessment and award of general damages. It is therefore no 
surprise that they are the major focus of the supposed tort reform in Australia. 
Naturally Victoria has participated in this national movement along with the 
other states and territories, though the changes implemented by governments 
are by no means uniform. 
 
Given the increasingly vocal backlash in New South Wales and to a certain 
extent in some other states and territories against what growing sections of 
society see as deformation of their rights and entitlements under this 
significant cause of action, it is timely to evaluate current legislative 
arrangements of relevance to Victoria for compensating non-economic loss 
pursuant to personal injuries due to negligence. 
 
 
II TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
Negligence law is a fault regime to effect unmediated corrective justice 
between a wrongdoer and a victim through the restitutionary measure of 
damages employed to correct the fault.2 As such tort law conventionally has 
been understood to be exclusively about corrective justice.3 But actually it 
has a number of objectives to fulfil:4 
 
• compensation function – fair and just recompense for injured 
persons; 
• promotion of safety or “deterrent” function – the encouragement of 
the highest standards in safety and risk management; and 
                                                 
2 Bruce Feldthusen, 'Posturing, Tinkering and Reforming the Law of Negligence — 
A Canadian Perspective?' (2002) 25(3) UNSW Law Journal 854, 856. 
3 Stephen D Sugarman, 'Tort Reform Through Damages Law Reform: An American 
Perspective' (2005) 27(3) Sydney Law Review 507, 507. 
4 Law Council of Australia, Insurance and Personal Injury Law – Why Do We Have 
Them? (2003) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/get/publications/2384814030.PDF> at 
25 November 2006  
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• corrective justice or responsibility function – a just allocation among 
wrongdoers of responsibility for compensation. 
 
It is argued that the law of negligence:5 
 
• provides deterrence by requiring people to pay damages to those they 
harm since people will be less inclined to engage in dangerous or 
careless behaviour if they, rather than society at large, are required to 
bear the cost of that negligence; 
• enforces individual responsibility by requiring people to take 
responsibility for their actions, either by paying for the damage they 
cause or by obtaining appropriate insurance to meet those losses. 
 
The operation of the law of negligence is said to have the following 
advantages in terms of:6 
 
• conforming to society's expectation that persons who cause injury to 
others by their fault must pay for the harm caused; 
• avoiding a need for self-help, including violent self-help as the courts 
order damages to be paid upon a finding of fault; 
• enhancing safety awareness by imposing a damages judgment on an 
individual or enterprise at fault for tortfeasors will normally take 
greater care in the future to avoid liability and publicity in the media 
also serves as a general deterrent for other potential defendants. 
 
 
III GENERAL DAMAGES 
 
The traditional purpose of tort damages at common law is to provide 
complete compensation for the victim's loss by forcing a wrongdoer who has 
caused harm to pay for everything necessary to make the specific plaintiff 
whole as awards are highly individualised as to their amount, so as to reflect 
the unique circumstances of every case.7 A judge or a jury hears the evidence 
of loss and awards an amount of damages based on the economic and non-
economic losses suffered by that claimant so as to return the plaintiff to the 
                                                 
5 Tim Bugg, ‘Negligence and damages – personal injury, property damage and pure 
economic loss’ (Speech delivered at the Fiji Law Society 50th Anniversary 
Convention, Fiji, 26 May 2006). 
6 Judd Epstein, 'Is the Law of Negligence Still Appropriate for Australia?' (2006) 
18(2) Legaldate 1, 1. 
7 Sugarman, above n 3, 507. 
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position before the incident insofar as money can do so.8 The person whose 
negligence has caused an injury is required to compensate the victim, on a 
once and for all basis, for all past present and future loss.9  
 
It is only fair that those harmed by another’s negligence should, as far as is 
reasonably possible, be restored to the position they were in prior to the 
injury or damage for the basic principle is that those who suffer harm through 
the fault of another should be compensated for their losses, in which “harm” 
covers all forms of injury or loss, including:10 
 
• temporary or permanent physical impairment or restriction; 
• damage to personal property, and 
• pure economic loss, encompassing past losses and predicted future 
loss of income and  opportunity. 
 
Non-economic loss arising from personal injury is loss ‘based neither on lost 
income nor on out-of-pocket financial payments made (or owed) by victims’ 
and examples of which include ‘physical pain and suffering that goes along 
with a physical trauma, the emotional harm that can come from an injury to 
one's self or a loved one, the disappointment or embarrassment coming from 
one's changed appearance or altered abilities to engage in pleasurable 
activities and favourite pastimes as a result of an injury, the harm to one's 
dignity from being wrongly injured by another, and so on.’11 
 
Therefore non-economic loss which is also referred to as non-pecuniary loss, 
is loss which is not itself monetary in character and includes the following 
major categories:12 
 
• pain and suffering, 
• loss of amenities; 
• loss of life expectancy; and 
• disfigurement. 
                                                 
8 Epstein, above n 6. 
9 Reg Graycar, 'Public Liability: A Plea for Facts' (2002) 8(2) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal - Forum 2, 2. 
10 Bugg, above n 5. 
11 Sugarman, above n 3, 512. 
12 Law Council of Australia, Tort Law Reform Resource Kit: Module A - Thresholds 
and Damages for Non-Economic Loss (2004) [Backgrounder – Damages for 
Noneconomic Loss and Thresholds] <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shared/ 
2404306316> at 26 November 2006. 
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Loss of amenities refers to the inability of a victim to enjoy life as he or she 
has before the injury in terms of, for example, the ability to work, play sport, 
engage in hobbies, marry, have children, realise ambition or achieve sexual 
satisfaction; whereas loss of expectation of life is loss of prospective 
happiness resulting from reduction of an injured person’s life expectancy.13 
 
Sometimes non-economic loss is simply referred to as pain and suffering, as 
that is often the most significant component of non-economic loss in a 
particular case, 14 and damages, as in compensation, for non-economic loss 
are also referred to as “general damages” or “damages for pain and 
suffering”.15 Underlying the award of general damages is the idea that money 
can provide the plaintiff with some consolation for having been injured.16 It is 
suggested that functions of an award of damages for non-pecuniary loss 
include:17 
 
• as a palliative; 
• to enable the purchase of alternative sources of satisfaction, and 
• to meet hidden expenses. 
 
 
IV CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND TORT REFORM 
 
It is useful to recap the background of the lead-up to the reform, especially 
for those unfamiliar with the subject. Clark and McInnes have provided an 
overview which has been summarised as follows:18 
 
The Commonwealth, and each State and Territory have introduced 
reforms in an attempt to deal with the ‘crisis’ perceived to be 
gripping the law of negligence and Australia's legal system. 
 
                                                 
13 Helen Coonan, 'Reform of Liability Insurance Law in Australia' (The Treasury of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), 82. 
14 Law Council of Australia, above n 12. 
15 Law Council of Australia, Thresholds for General Damages (2004) 
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/get/publications/2404048740.pdf> at 25 November 
2006 . 
16 Coonan, above n 13, 82. 
17 Law Council of Australia, above n 15. 
18 S Stuart Clark and Ross McInnes, 'Unprecedented Reform: The New Tort Law' 
(2004) 15(2) Insurance Law Journal 1, 1-3. 
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These reforms have their origins in the so called public liability crisis 
which emerged in late 2001/early 2002. 
 
It was suggested that parts of Australia's legal system were ‘out of 
control’ while sections of the community began to criticise the 
‘culture of blame’ which was said to have become entrenched in 
Australian society. 
 
These opinions were fuelled by a combination of factors including 
the collapse of both a major insurer and a medical indemnity 
organisation, spiralling premiums and a number of highly publicised 
awards of damages. There were also concerns that insurance for 
many socially useful activities including medicine, volunteer 
activities and community organisations and events, was either no 
longer available or so expensive as to be unaffordable. 
 
Drivers of the ‘crisis’ [are:] 
  
Community attitude  
 
A fundamental force underlying the liability crisis is 
the litigious mindset entrenched in many individuals 
within the community.  
 
The development of the tort of negligence 
 
From the 1960s to the 1990s judicial expansion of 
the concept of negligence was ubiquitous. During 
this time the courts manifestly extended the 
circumstances in which negligence may be found to 
have occurred and the scope of damages recoverable.  
 
The downturn in the insurance industry cycle  
 
Insurance industry experts and analysts have 
partially attributed the present liability crisis to the 
cyclical nature of the insurance industry.  
 
The emergence of specialist plaintiff law firms: Legal 
advertising and ‘no win no fee’ arrangements  
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The growth of specialist plaintiff law firms, 
particularly in the area of personal injury, has been 
pinpointed as contributing to the increased 
propensity of people to make a claim following 
injury. 
 
Plaintiffs’ law firms have also taken advantage of the 
deregulation of legal fees, including the introduction 
of contingency uplift fees and ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements, to draw business. There is a view that 
the manifestation of ‘no win no fee’ and like 
arrangements merely encourages claims (often said 
to be unmeritorious) and ultimately results in an 
increase in insurance costs. 
 
Class actions 
 
Since the enactment of legislation governing class 
action procedure at a federal and State level, there 
have been several high profile class actions in 
Australia, particularly in the area of product liability. 
While to date few actions have proceeded to hearing, 
it is argued that the emergence of representative 
proceedings as a means of recourse has materially 
influenced overall insurance costs and the 
community's attitude towards access to justice. 
 
It is often overlooked that besides the public liability insurance crisis, there 
was also a medical indemnity insurance crisis. Specifically: 
 
Particular problems were caused in 2002 when UMP the largest 
medical indemnity insurer in Australia went into provisional 
liquidation as a result of a number of pressures, including poor 
management in the 1990s, underprovisioning for long-tail claims, a 
sharp increase in premiums and the failure of its re-insurer, HIH. 
Additional problems were caused by the withdrawal of insurer St 
Paul from the primary medical indemnity insurance market and the 
implementation of financial restrictions imposed by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and its new prudential 
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standards, including those relating to minimum capital 
requirements.19 
 
In addition, ‘there was an influential body of legal opinion that had become 
critical of the operation of the common law, arguing that the standard of care 
imposed on defendants had become too stringent, the levels of care required 
of potential plaintiffs for their own safety had been unacceptably reduced, 
that principles of causation had been stretched to barely tolerable limits and 
that the principles on which damages are awarded were in at least some 
respects too generous.’20 As a result, a judicial ‘reform’ as distinguished from 
the subsequent legislative ‘reform’, of the common law of negligence has 
been well underway by the time the insurance crisis has erupted, as Cappa, 
Forrest, Hinchy and Nase have pointed out:21 
 
[P]rior to the ‘insurance crisis’ and the National Review of the Law 
of Negligence…the High Court had sought to return to basics and to 
redevelop a principled approach to the law of negligence. The High 
Court has endeavoured to do so not only in determining the duty of 
care element, but more importantly, to toughen the standard of care 
requirements that determine breach of that duty. 
 
[J]udicial decisions also reflect the significant shift in society towards 
accepting personal responsibility, which has not always been 
reflected in the inadequate weight given to the conduct of the 
plaintiff over past decades. 
 
 
V STATE OF PLAY ACROSS AUSTRALIA 
 
Whilst changes implemented by all Australian jurisdictions since 2002 can be 
broadly categorised into three types which are establishing liability, damages 
and claims procedures, those made to the laws of damages are aimed at 
removing the smaller claims from the system while setting appropriate limits 
on particular heads of damage for very large ones.22 
                                                 
19 Law Council of Australia, above n 12, Backgrounder – Medical Negligence. 
20 John Keeler, 'Personal Responsibility and the Reforms Recommended by the Ipp 
Report: 'Time Future Contained in Time Past' (2006) 14(1) Torts Law Journal 48, 49. 
21 Clare Cappa, Craig Forrest, Russell Hinchy and Vernon Nase, ‘Tort Deform or 
Tort Reform? Winding Back the Clock on Negligence’ (2003) 28(5) Alternative Law 
Journal 212, 213. 
22 Coonan, above n 13, 7-8. 
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Governments achieve the aim by introducing caps and thresholds on general 
damages. A cap is a maximum amount of damages that can be awarded by 
courts. A threshold is a barrier to access to damages such that compensation 
is only received if a victim satisfies a minimum level in terms of monetary 
value, permanent impairment, or the worst conceivable case.23 
 
The current legislative framework on the award of general damages for each 
jurisdiction in Australia is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Whilst the Trade Practices (Personal Injuries and Death) Act 2004 (Cth) 
restricts claims for general damages arising from death or personal injury 
where those proceedings relate to Part IVA (unconscionable conduct), 
Division 1A (product safety and product information) or 2A (actions against 
manufacturers and importers of goods) of Part V or Part VA (liability of 
manufacturers and importers of defective goods), it does not apply to 
Division 1 of Part V (unfair practices), of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth).24 But following the enactment of the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Personal Injuries and Death) Act 2006 (Cth), damages for non-smoking 
related personal injury or death are no longer recoverable for a contravention 
of the provisions relating to unfair practices, such as ss 52, 53.25  
 
Given the focus of this paper, greater details on the Victorian legal regime 
concerning general damages for personal injury are provided herewith. The 
impairment assessment process includes the following steps: 26 27 
 
• Unless the respondent gives a waiver, a claimant has to be 
assessed by a medical practitioner who has undertaken an 
approved course in accordance with the Accident Compensation 
Act 1985 (Vic). 
                                                 
23 Law Council of Australia, above n 15. 
24 John Morgan and Matthew Skinner, Civil Liability Reform - Recent 
Commonwealth Legislation - Finishing Touches? (2004) Allens Arthur Robinson 
<http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/insur/pap04aug04.htm> at 25 November 2006 , 8. 
25 The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 82 (1AAA). 
26 Joanne Girgenti and Ben Hall, Victoria’s Second Tranche of Civil Liability 
Reforms (2003) FindLaw Australia <http://www.findlaw.com.au/article/8996.htm> at 
24 November 2006 . 
27 Louise Radloff, Andrew Saxton and George Triantopoulos, Tort Reform in Action 
Across the East Coast (2005) Ebsworth & Ebsworth Lawyers 
<http://www.ebsworth.com.au/ebsworth/website/eepublishing.nsf/Content/Publicatio
n_Paper_TortReform_17Mar05>. 
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• A medical practitioner must provide a certificate of assessment 
that states whether the level of impairment meets the relevant 
threshold. 
• A claimant can seek the respondent’s agreement to waive the 
requirement of a certificate and the respondent has 60 days in 
which to respond to such request. 
• A respondent either accepts the assessment in writing or disputes 
it within 60 days by referring it to a Medical Panel constituted 
under the aforementioned Accident Compensation Act at its own 
cost. Otherwise a failure to respond results in a ‘deemed 
acceptance’ of the assessment on the part of the respondent. 
• A Medical Panel must give its binding opinion in writing within 
60 days after the referral is made. 
• A defendant can waive the assessment process but must do so in 
writing acknowledging it is the proper defendant and accepting 
the injury is a significant injury. 
• Upon receiving a request for waiver, if a defendant considers it is 
not the proper defendant it must give reasons for this belief and 
any information that may assist the plaintiff to identify that party.  
• Where there are multiple defendants, one defendant can act on 
behalf of the others for the purpose of the assessment process 
subject to the consent of the other defendants. 
 
To pass the threshold for general damages, the injury must be permanent and 
as such it probably does not include mere trespass to the person or false 
imprisonment.28 All impairments arising out of an incident must be included 
in the one assessment.29 A Medical Panel’s reassessment is final and must be 
accepted by the court unless the panel has not followed proper procedures.30 
 
‘[T]he WorkCover and Transport Accident Schemes have been untouched by 
the reforming Acts’.31 
 
                                                 
28 James Ruddle, The Wrongs & Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 - What are 
the Changes (26 February 2004) Victorian Government Solicitor's Office 
<www.vgso.vic.gov.au/documents/wrongs.pdf> at 26 November 2006, 6. 
29 Michael Martin, Victorian Tort Law Reform Continues (2003) Sparke Helmore 
<http://www.sparke.com.au/file?publication/3617> at 26 November 2006. 
30 Coonan, above n 13, 84. 
31 Michael Lombard and Michael McGarvie, "Its OK to Say Sorry But Can You 
Sue?" - Victoria's Personal Injury Reforms (2003) Holding Redlich [3] 
<www.holdingredlich.com.au/articles/637662_1.PDF> at 25 November 2006. 
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VI CRITICISMS AGAINST THE REFORM 
 
‘[C]hanges that parliaments have enacted don’t deserve the title ‘reform’ 
[since] changes for the better…is what ‘reform’ meant…’32 
 
Given the sweeping nature of the legislative changes made, it is only natural 
that since the so-called reform began, the validity of the underlying 
justifications has been questioned by scholars, practitioners and members of 
the public. Indeed a high level literature survey quickly shows widespread 
concerns on all the major facets of the entire reform. An understanding of 
these concerns provides the context for analysing the implications in Victoria. 
 
The spectrum of criticisms against the changes can be grouped into the areas 
of premise, objective, rationale, process and outcome. With many seeing the 
Ipp Panel as having given the impetus to tort reform, it is not surprising that 
its review report has attracted much scrutiny and condemnation. 
 
The premise for change is a fundamental starting point of any critique on the 
reform. In this respect, not only was the ‘Ipp Panel not permitted to challenge 
the premise that negligence law was “unpredictable”; nor that it was “too 
easy” for plaintiffs to recover; nor that damages were “too high”… it reached 
the conclusion that the perception alone was sufficient to justify reform’ since 
it did “gather ‘evidence” that negligence law was so perceived by some 
members of the Australian public.’33 Moreover ‘[w]hether or not the 
operation of the principles of negligence law and the assessment of damages 
was responsible for the fund failures and increases in insurance premiums 
that helped to provoke the crisis was not included in the terms of reference 
and the Ipp Panel did not investigate and formed no view about the 
relationship between them or the likely impact of its recommendations on the 
insurance market.’34 Indeed, according to Feldthusen, ‘[t]he mandate given to 
the Ipp Panel posits that “damages for personal injury has become 
unaffordable and unsustainable as the principle source of compensation for 
those injured by the fault of another” and identifies “[t]he solution to the 
problem…[namely,] limiting liability and quantum of damages”’, but: 
 
                                                 
32 John North, ‘Beyond the Pain Threshold’ (Speech delivered at the Personal Injury 
and Compensation Forum of Law Council of Australia, Sydney, 3 June 2005) [1-2] 
<www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shared/2413401029> at 25 November 2006. 
33 Feldthusen, above n 2, 857. 
34 Keeler, above n 20, 50. 
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Both the problem and the type of solution appear to have been stated 
by fiat, with no underlying empirical evidence in support. Nor was 
the Ipp Panel empowered to investigate or challenge either. 
Strikingly absent is any desire to investigate alleged malfunction in 
the private insurance market.35 
 
If the premise of reform is not beyond reproach then its objective naturally is 
not either. As Mullany has said, ‘[b]ased on highly questionable, certainly 
unproven, premises, Ipp Panel was required, inter alia, to: “develop and 
evaluate principled options to limit ... quantum of awards for damages”’.36 
On the other hand ‘tort law reforms explicitly designed to reduce both the 
number and value of personal injury claims could be expected to alleviate an 
insurance crisis (albeit not by addressing its causes).’37 
 
Furthermore Davis contends that the Review of the Law of Negligence has 
not ‘critically examine[d] the case that has been argued by the insurance 
industry for tort reform [which he] finds it empty of substance’ and is ‘flawed 
for three reasons’: 
 
First, the Review arose out of the insurers' public campaign for tort 
reform, a campaign big on rhetoric but scant on facts. Second, the 
terms of reference of the Ipp Review were designed so as to deny any 
analysis of the truth of insurer's claims about the causes of premium 
increases. Third, the membership of the Review committee was 
stacked with persons ideologically committed to tort reform 
regardless of the true causes for premium increases.38 
 
Other disparagement of the reform process centres on its hastiness:  
Tort reform has not been approached in a comprehensive and 
principled way. Governments wanted the quickest fix for 
skyrocketing premiums without looking at the other side of the 
equation: what compensation do victims of negligence need, and how 
best can that need be met?39  
                                                 
35 Feldthusen, above n 2, 856. 
36 Mullany, above n 1, 876. 
37 E W Wright, 'National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After 
"Ipp"' (Law Council of Australia, 2006), 29-30. 
38 Rob Davis, 'The Tort Reform Crisis' (2002) 25(3) University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 865, 865. 
39 Robert Pelletier, Tort Reform Needs an Injection of Fairness (2005) FindLaw 
Australia <http://www.findlaw.com.au/article/13654.htm> at 24 November 2006 . 
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[T]here is evident a seemingly unflinching political determination to 
rush to reform irrespective of the merits of the cases for and against 
that momentous step.40 
 
Another aspect of the reform that has attracted much denigration is the lack 
of conclusive evidentiary support to justify the changes. Graycar has 
highlighted that: 
 
In its September 2002 report, the Australian Health Ministers 
Advisory Council Legal Process Reform Group (‘Neave Committee’) 
on medical indemnity issues was careful to acknowledge that there 
really is insufficient data to blame litigation for the insurance crisis.41  
 
Graycar elaborates further by quoting from the Neave Committee report: 
 
Many changes which are suggested as so-called tort reforms are 
simply benefit reductions, which if not well-considered will have the 
effect of increasing the harm and disadvantage suffered by those 
people who are most in need of assistance. Cost containment is an 
appropriate aim for reform. However the ... basis for changes [must 
be] justified by the evidence.42 
 
Bugg adds to this view by saying that: 
 
[T]ort law reforms were hastily-introduced and ill-thought out. They 
were a knee-jerk reaction to a problem that, according to this hard 
data, had little or nothing to do with litigation rates…43 
Bugg’s perspective is supported by Wright who states in his report that:44 
 
[T]he direct premise on which the Ipp Review proceeded was not that 
claim numbers were increasing but rather something a little different, 
namely that personal injury claims were becoming increasingly 
successful and were resulting in increasingly larger awards. 
However, neither the Ipp Review nor the coterie of government 
                                                 
40 Mullany, above n 1, 876. 
41 Graycar, above n 9, 4. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Lawyers Weekly, Final Report: No Justification for Tort Reforms (2006) 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/articles/1E/0C04101E. 
asp?Type=53&Category=853> at 25 November 2006 . 
44 Wright, above n 37, 29-30. 
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policy makers responsible for implementing its recommendations had 
empirical confirmation of these supposed facts either. The data 
required to confirm the “widely held view” that these were the facts 
was (and is) simply not available. If, however, it was indeed the case 
that it had become “in recent times too easy” for plaintiffs to succeed 
in personal injury cases, and to obtain damages awards that were 
“frequently too high”, one would surely expect an evident rise in 
claims over time. We did not find this trend. 
 
It is evident that the reformers could have had no empirical 
foundation, either for predicting the impact of the reforms on 
personal injury litigation in their jurisdictions, or for determining by 
how much it was desirable to reduce it. 
 
 These are not facts which inspire confidence in the reform process. 
 
Given the abovementioned censure of the reform, it is to be expected that its 
outcome draws the most stinging denunciation. In general, Pelletier opines 
that: 
 
[T]ort reform as it has proceeded in Australia in recent years … has 
been, according to the Chief Justice [Spigelman], a response to a 
perceived crisis in the price and availability of insurance. We have 
applied a plaster to stem the rise in premiums in the short term 
without looking at questions of fairness and proper compensation.45  
 
Feldthusen also comments on the superficiality of the reform solution in that 
‘[t]he problem they identified was the perception that, it is too easy to recover 
in negligence’, accordingly ‘[t]he solution they recommended was to create 
the perception that this would be so no longer … [i]f we leave aside the 
provocative questions of how such a perception arose, how it was proven, 
and how it might be corrected, as did the Panel’.46 
 
At a jurisdictional level, it has been said that: 
 
                                                 
45 Pelletier, above n 39. 
46 Feldthusen, above n 2, 856. 
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The unfairness and inconsistency of the NSW system of personal 
injury laws shows little evidence of being the product of a logical 
policy determination.47 
 
It appears that both the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 and 
the Civil Liability Act 2003 are a solution to what is simply thought 
may be a problem. The solution is proposed before the nature of the 
problem is identified.48 
 
Overall it is said that: 
 
Currently the system is out of balance [with the] three very important 
functions of negligence law have been severely diluted: 
 
• fair and just compensation for people injured through fault has 
become, in many instances, a thing of the past; 
• individuals and organisations no longer have the same tort law 
deterrence from employing poor safety and risk management 
practices; and 
• personal responsibility among wrongdoers has been 
diminished.49 
 
The insurance crisis is nothing compared to the crisis our society 
faces from underwriter driven tort reform. The current round of tort 
reform has caused enormous and permanent damage to the integrity 
of Australia's legal system.50 
 
 
VII A CRITIQUE OF COONAN’S ‘MANIFESTO’ 
 
Any evaluation of the reform will not be complete without examining the 
perspective of its chief proponent, Senator Helen Coonan who as the then 
Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer has ‘bulldozed’ her way 
through all the criticisms to pave the way for its implementation. Her essay, 
‘Insurance Premiums and Law Reform - Affordable Cover and the Role of 
                                                 
47 The Law Society of New South Wales, 'Personal and Public Responsibilities in 
Injury Compensation' (2006) (April) Law Society Journal 57, 57. 
48 Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy, and Nase, above n 21, 215. 
49 North, above n 32, 2, 5. 
50 Davis, above n 38, 870. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                             VOLUME 10 NO 2 140
Government’,51 presents her views or at least those which she represents, 
subscribes or endorses, for justifying the reform. Although it is published in 
the University of New South Wales Law Journal, it hardly qualifies as an 
academic exegesis for it is full of hyperbole but short on proofs. It is 
therefore aptly described as a manifesto. 
 
The major claims in her article together with commentators’ counterpoint are 
as follow.  
 
Claim 1: 
 
There is a widely held view that the current problems in the 
insurance market are due in large part to the operation of the legal 
system. It is clear that the broader community is dissatisfied with the 
seemingly random nature of court awards.52 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
[C]hanges were justified on the grounds that they reflected 
‘community concerns’ or ‘changing community standards or values’. 
One may be sceptical as to where and how those community 
standards could ever be reliably discovered by anyone, let alone 
courts; whether in fact there is much consensus in the community on 
many of these issues at all; and, even if there were, whether those 
community standards are, at worst, capricious and, at best, 
changeable and reflective of particular circumstances as they 
arise.(McDonald)53  
 
The Queensland Parliament, however, has had some difficulty in 
distinguishing between principle and policy, and, under the guise of 
reform, has sought to legislate on principles currently being worked 
through by the High Court.(Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy, and Nase)54  
 
                                                 
51 Helen Coonan, 'Insurance Premiums and Law Reform - Affordable Cover and the 
Role of Government' (2002) 8(2) UNSW Law Journal 7. 
52 Coonan, above n 51, 7. 
53 Barbara McDonald, 'The Impact of the Civil Liability Legislation on Fundamental 
Policies and Principles of the Common Law of Negligence' (2006) 14(3) Torts Law 
Journal 268, 299. 
54 Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy, and Nase, above n 21, 215. 
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A Macquarie University study reported in The Financial Review on 4 
June suggests that damages awards before 2000 were not 
excessive.(Gordon)55 
 
Claim 2: 
 
There is also a strong perception that an increasing culture of blame 
has emerged within our society. This has led individuals to seek 
redress through the legal system, where in similar circumstances in 
the past, the individual would have been more prepared to assume 
responsibility for the consequences of their own actions.56 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
[I]nsurance premiums have indeed risen substantially, but there is no 
actual evidence that this is linked to tort claims or to our becoming an 
increasingly litigious or 'blame' society. … [O]ne of the biggest 
problems facing our community is that we link blame to 
compensation, rather than accept collective responsibility for those 
who, because of injury or illness or disability, are unable to care for 
themselves.(Graycar)57 
 
Claim 3: 
 
It is the Commonwealth Government's view that the area in which it 
can make the largest contribution to resolving the current state of the 
insurance market is by providing leadership to State and Territory 
Governments to encourage reform of the law to stabilise the level of 
litigation.58 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
Overall, therefore, the court statistics appear to support a view that 
there has been a steady increase in public liability insurance bodily 
                                                 
55 John Gordon, The State of the Insurance Market: "Crisis? What Crisis?" (2004) 
Australian Insurance Law Association <www.aila.com.au/research/2004_papers/ 
GordonJ.pdf> at 1 December 2006, 3. 
56 Coonan, above n 51, 7. 
57 Graycar, above n 9, 4-5. 
58 Coonan, above n 51, 7. 
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injury claims over the last five to ten years. There is no evidence of 
an ‘explosion of litigation’ in recent years.(Atkins and Pearson)59 
 
The Productivity Commission Report 2001 reported civil litigation 
rates falling 4% for 4 years. The ACCC said there was no link 
between litigation rates and premiums (Dr David Cousins 13/6/02). 
The Commonwealth's own actuaries said “There is no evidence of an 
explosion in litigation in recent years” (Report to Heads of Treasury 
30 May 2002). … Insurance industry data demonstrated claims per 
policies issued had fallen in the 10 years since 1992. … Surveys of 
County and District Court registries around the country showed no 
significant increase in rates of public liability claims or damages 
awarded… [A] survey of 700 community organisations by 
ourcommunity.com in March 2002 found 96% had made no public 
liability claim in 5 years. Of claims made, payouts over the 5 years 
represented 3.5% of premiums collected in one year. The average 
claim was $8875 and only two claims exceeded $50,000. Researchers 
at Curtin University studied the claims history of over 800 sporting 
groups across Australia and New Zealand and found that only 3% 
had made public liability claims in the last 10 years.(Gordon)60 
 
Claim numbers grew from 43,000 in 1992/93 to 78,000 in 1999/00, 
an increase of 81%, but: 
 
– policy numbers grew from 1.23 million in1992/93 to 3.01 million 
in 1999/200, an increase of 145%; (Cumpston Sarjeant [sic])61 
 
Average public liability settlement by private insurers increased from 
$7,600 in 1992/93 to $13,200 in 1999/00, but: 
– insurance excesses have increased in same period meaning 
threshold to make a claim has increased, and with it, average claim 
costs. (Cumpston Sarjeant [sic])62  
 
                                                 
59 Geoff Atkins and Estelle Pearson, 'Public Liability Insurance: Practical Proposals 
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Claim 4: 
 
[N]eed to act quickly63 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
[A]fter its Report was released on 2 October 2002, there was barely 
any time for or attempt at consultation on its recommendations. The 
second, much more substantial, stage of the Civil Liability reforms 
was enacted in Parliament barely three weeks later. It would seem 
that the criticism of legislation as ‘hastily and inconsiderately 
adopted’… might be well deserved here.(McDonald)64  
 
Claim 5: 
 
The Panel sought to strike a balance between the interests of injured 
people and those of the community at large and to impose a 
reasonable burden of responsibility on individuals to take care of 
others and to take care of themselves.65 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
Any reform aimed at increasing the responsibility of people for their 
own safety in the face of dangers created by others necessarily runs 
the risk of causing significant injustices by tipping the balance too 
far.(Keeler)66 
 
The effect of these provisions is that an injured claimant subsidises 
the costs of cutting insurance premiums. Those who act negligently 
are partially relieved of the consequences of their default, as is their 
insurer, to the detriment of the victim of their negligence, and 
possible the broader community.”(de Jersey)67 “In the course of the 
debate, much was said about reasserting a need for people to accept 
                                                 
63 Coonan, above n 51, 8. 
64 Barbara McDonald, 'Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The 
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Sydney Law Review 443, 445. 
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responsibility for their own actions. That must however work both 
ways. A difficultly about these provisions, arguably, is that they 
suggest the wrongdoer is to a degree being protected.(de Jersey)68 
 
Claim 6: 
 
Insurance is a vital thread running through the fabric of our 
society…[and] [a] better outcome is getting the settings right to 
ensure the market works more effectively.69 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
Insurance crises that result in sudden large increases in premiums are 
a recurring phenomenon. States became monopoly motor vehicle 
third party insurers because private insurers withdrew from that 
market and there were insurance crises (especially in the fields of 
third party and workers compensation insurance) in 1958-1960, the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.(Keeler)70  
 
These factors…: 
• loss of capacity by international re-insurers and insurers following a 
series of natural disasters and the tragedy of September 11, 2001; 
• the collapse of the HIH Insurance Group (which the Law Council 
notes had about a fifth of the public liability market); 
• the substantial fall in the value of worldwide equities markets over 
the last eighteen months (estimated to be over $US100bn); and 
• the financial strictures imposed by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) of new Prudential standards, in 
particular the minimum capital requirements. 
…contribute to, and make it possible to realise a desire of the 
remaining insurers, who are effectively monopoly or near-monopoly 
providers to a captive market, to make profits or recoup prior years’ 
losses due to underpricing in prior periods.(Heinrich)71 
 
Australian liability insurers (like their counterparts in Canada and the 
US) have traditionally (and willingly) operated with negative 
underwriting results, relying instead on investment returns for their 
                                                 
68 Ditto. 
69 Coonan, above n 51, 9. 
70 Keeler, above n 34, 48. 
71 Heinrich, above n 61, 5. 
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profits. Indeed, APRA statistics reveal that over the last 20 years 
Australian general insurers, in aggregate, have never booked a 
positive underwriting result.(Davis)72 
 
Average price rises of 30% in 2001/2002, but: 
– premiums were unrealistically low in previous years; 
– as a percentage of GDP, premiums are back to 1986-1987 
levels.(Heinrich)73 
 
Particular (one-off?) pressure affect this year, namely HIH exit, 
September 11 and APRA requirements. Insurance companies will be 
in profit next year without any changes.(Heinrich)74 
 
Claim 7: 
 
Once implemented, a nationally consistent negligence law will 
provide a more efficient system for the allocation and management of 
risk.75 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
The aspiration of national consistency was expressed by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers on 15 November 2002 
at a Ministerial meeting on public liability insurance. The Ministers 
agreed in principle on a package of reforms designed to implement 
the key recommendations of the Ipp Report.... In so doing, the 
Ministers noted that the legislation introduced in NSW provided a 
model to develop nationally consistent reform.(Clark, Harris and 
Mclnnes)76 
 
Although the Commonwealth Government may have had uniform 
legislation in mind when it asked a panel to review the law of 
negligence and to make recommendations for legislation to rein in 
negligence claims, it is unfortunate that legislation from State to 
State, though similar in many provisions, is not uniform overall. Not 
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only is there variation in the provisions, there is often also a 
difference in the stated objectives of the tort reform legislation, 
which can only cause greater diversity in interpretation of some of 
the more generalised or ambiguous provisions.(McDonald)77 
 
The challenge for insurers is even more profound. Underwriters 
seeking to price a particular risk will need to assess the likelihood of 
the relevant risk occurring across eight separate legislative 
frameworks. This will not be a particularly easy task for any 
underwriter of public liability risks.(Kearney)78 
 
Claim 8: 
 
[T]here are good prospects that premiums should be stabilised and 
that there will be downward pressure on premiums in the mid to 
longer-term.79 
 
Counterpoint: 
 
The changes to legislation in the States in the aftermath of the Ipp 
Report produced a reduction in the number and cost of claims, but at 
best a stabilisation of insurance premiums. Any more recent 
reduction in them is likely to result more from the restoration of 
investment income and the effects of competition in pursuit of 
market share than from the effects of that legislation.(Keeler)80 
 
Claim 9: 
 
 Law reform is central to dealing with the problem.81 
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Counterpoint: 
 
While much of this ‘insurance crisis’ relates to the functioning of the 
insurance industry itself, the law of negligence has been implicated 
by the insurance industry pointing to the perceived uncertainties in 
the application of the common law, increases in the number of 
insurance claims, and most disturbingly, an increase in extremely 
large damages awards. (Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy, and Nase)82 
 
The truth is that the current crisis has primarily arisen out of a variety 
of complex commercial and economic factors.(Cashman)83 
 
[T]he current situation in relation to the affordability and availability 
of public liability insurance and medical indemnity insurance, is 
principally caused by factors unrelated to the legal 
system.(Heinrich)84 
 
The Institute of Actuaries of Australia concluded the ‘insurance 
crisis’ was the direct result of industry mismanagement, including 
pricing to attract premium income rather than to meet costs, and 
gross manipulation of case estimates (McCarthy P, IAA, 
2001).(Gordon)85 
 
Each crisis brought with it responses that centred very largely on 
legal change: for example, in South Australia the enduring 
consequences of the crisis of the 1980s included the abolition of 
common law claims by employees against employers and a regime of 
restrictions on the award and levels of damages in motor vehicle third 
party cases. So it was no surprise that remedial action for the crisis of 
2001-2002 should also focus on the law of negligence. It was the 
most attractive area for liability insurers to focus on (rather than, say, 
anything that might suggest there had been deficiencies in managing 
their own businesses)…(Keeler)86 
 
[T]he problem that now exists is the consequence of – 
                                                 
82 Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy, and Nase, above n 21, 212. 
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Continuing increases in claims costs for personal injury claims (a 20 
or 30 year phenomenon that currently shows no signs of abating) 
An insurance market dominated by defensive pricing and 
underwriting by insurers (a recent phenomenon and part of a severe 
insurance market cycle).(Pearson and Atkins)87 
 
A gradual real increase in claims costs over a twenty year period may 
well be, at least in part, the price of medical and economic advances 
which have benefited the Australian community. … [C]urrent claim 
costs have been compared to comparable figures from the late 
seventies or early eighties with the implication that the law had got it 
right then and what was right then is right now. That is not 
necessarily the case at all, our community has changed considerably 
in that time in terms of prosperity, education and technology 
(Heinrich).88 
 
 
IV  A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE REFORM 
 
This author’s fundamental objection to the legislative reform of the tort of 
negligence is that it has in many regards aspects that are unprincipled in 
terms of self-evident truths and unalienable rights, to borrow the words from 
the American Declaration of Independence. 
 
One of the premises of the reform legislation ‘went to the heart of the 
Government's concerns about a litigation culture’89 as ‘[i]n the words of the 
[former New South Wales] Premier, …Bob Carr… reforms are intended “to 
wind back this culture of blame”.’90 Davis eloquently summarises this 
phenomenon as ‘a culture in which everyone feels there is no injury without 
blame, and no blame without a claim. …[in short] “blame and claim”’.91 
Although there has been much debate as to the evidence of such a culture’s 
existence in Australia, this authors submits that such a point is irrelevant for 
it is a matter of perspective - a culture of blame can equally be positively 
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characterised as a culture to ‘keep the bastards honest’ to borrow the popular 
catchcry of Don Chipp, the founder of the Australian Democrats Party. 
Furthermore, there can only be blame if a certain party is at fault. The 
principle of justice gives a party who feels illegally aggrieved by another the 
right to be heard on the merits of the case. If there is no basis for the party’s 
claim, then the matter can be dealt with by the sanctions for abusing court 
process. So why does personal injury caused by negligence have to be 
singled out for extra, special treatment when there is already in place legal 
deterrence against vexatious actions that may arise from a culture of blame at 
large? 
 
Therefore based on the aforementioned reason, it is also irrelevant as to 
whether there is an explosion of litigation, the supposed consequence of a 
society with a culture of blame. If there really is an explosion of valid 
personal injury claims based on negligence as the cause of action, then the 
explosion is just a symptom of the underlying causes which should be the 
focus of any just, sustainable solution. It may also point to a need for courts 
to adopt more efficient case management practices or foster greater use of 
alternative dispute resolution regimes, both of which are supposed to be 
already in place, if not in progress, in Australia as part of a broader reform of 
the legal system. On the other hand, if there is an explosion of intentional 
baseless claims in the same category, then the issue is the sufficiency of the 
penalties for deterring such claims. As such any culture of blame and 
explosion of litigation, even if they exist, are at best phenomena rather than 
causes of the insurance crisis. Indeed, if governments insist on the validity of 
the ‘culture of blame’ premise, should they not mandate education and 
legislation that indoctrinate the whole population to strictly adhere to the 
biblical teaching of turning the other cheek for such an action is at least 
principled, consistent and likely to save the society the tremendous cost of 
having to maintain liability insurance and even the court system? 
 
Another premise which Coonan has espoused in her manifesto is that 
although ‘[t]he Australian Consumer and Competition Commission…[has] 
identified a range of factors impacting on the cost of public liability and 
professional indemnity insurance…it has been necessary for governments to 
consider which cost drivers can realistically be contained within the 
Australian context…[since t]he state of the international reinsurance or 
investment markets is not a matter that Australian governments can do very 
much to influence.’92 Yet it is interesting to note that Trowbridge Consulting 
in its report prepared for the meeting of Ministers on 27 March 2002 has 
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listed 10 possible claim cost responses and 13 possible insurance market 
responses.93 But in its report dated May 30 2002 to the Insurance Issues 
Working Group of Heads of Treasuries, it has 21 claim cost- and/or law-
related proposals and 9 insurance market-related proposals out of a total of 35 
proposals.94 Moreover the insurance market-related proposals are ‘soft’ and 
easy on insurers with the hard solutions previously suggested such as ‘[s]tart 
a new Government Insurance Office’, ‘[m]ake supply of insurance 
compulsory for insurers’ and ‘[s]et maximum prices that can apply’, simply 
disappeared in the course of less than three months between the two reports 
without a word of explanation as to how and why the proposals have been 
selected out of the possible responses. Perhaps it is because ‘our government 
has no power to dictate to private insurance companies…’95 as stated by Rod 
Welford, Queensland’s former Attorney-General. But what makes the 
governments think that they have the power to ‘dictate’ to the Australian 
people? Is it because it is simply the law of the jungle with the weaker getting 
pushed over by the stronger? Or is it because of the laissez-faire political 
ideology of the Liberal Party that rules the Federal Government? If so, why 
should it not be laissez-faire with legal rights as well as commercial rights? 
 
Coonan has also mentioned in her paper the ‘need to act quickly’ and get ‘the 
settings right to ensure the [insurance] market works more effectively.’96 But 
where is the urgency of governments and bureaucrats to fix the insurance 
market when APRA statistics indicate that ‘[t]he returns [of the insurance 
industry] in 1998-99 and 1999-2000 were lower than the cash rates’97 – the 
two years before HIH’s collapse, especially when there has been precedents 
of insurance crises in Australia? Why have the politicians and bureaucrats not 
learnt their lessons? Where were the ‘far-sighted reforms’98 as touted by 
Coonan? 
 
Coonan’s most intriguing, if not hypocritical, statements are that on one 
hand, ‘[g]overnments are elected to address the concerns of the 
community’,99 yet ‘relatively speaking, personal injury law provides very 
generous compensation to a very small proportion of the population at 
considerable expense to the rest of the community[ and t]here is an 
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overwhelming consumer interest in restoring the balance in a system where, 
at present, the benefits disproportionately favour the few.’100 Surely 
governments are to address the concerns of all communities in the society 
rather than to suppress a minority for the majority. Her statements are 
divisive and unwarranted. It is fortunate that those who are injured are a 
minority in this country and hopefully is going to remain so for who wants 
their country to be a nation of the disabled. Relative to what and whose 
standard is compensation “very generous” and how are “the benefits 
disproportionate”? It is a dangerous argument being mounted by Coonan for 
if it is valid then what is to stop governments from applying the same to 
legislate preventing senior citizens from accessing Medicare if they are above 
a certain age on the ground that they cost the society too much relative to the 
size of their group and thus should rely on their own means to pay for 
healthcare services, or withholding life support medical service to injured 
people in coma unless that person can afford such service because of health 
budget constraints? 
 
Furthermore where is the common sense, let alone principle and consistency, 
when the second Trowbridge Consulting report then forms the basis of the 
terms of reference for the Ipp panel? Is it not ironic that the tort reform is 
based on a blueprint developed by actuaries? It is even more bizarre that the 
legislative changes of a tort reform are wide reaching to the extent that they 
apply “regardless of whether the claim for damages is brought in tort, in 
contract, under statute or otherwise”.101 
 
There are undoubtedly many aspects of the reform which do not inspire 
confidence but in this author’s opinion none more so when Coonan, the 
leading advocate of the reform, does not seem to be able to get simple facts 
right. According to her same article, ‘bodily injury claims have been 
increasing Australia-wide on average by 10 per cent per annum over the past 
decade.’102 Yet a search of the second Trowbridge Consulting report which is 
her cited source does not reveal any such information but rather that ‘the 
average bodily injury claim size has increased at 10% per annum’103 with the 
same information repeated in ‘Table 2 – Fitted Average Size – Bodily Injury’ 
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of the same report.104 This ‘10 per cent’ figure is also stated in the first 
Trowbridge Consulting report.105 It is a big difference between the number of 
claims and the average claim size. This error is particularly peculiar since she 
has not cited any pinpoint reference in her relevant footnote. 
 
This author cannot help but agree with Feldthusen that, insofar as the tort 
reform is concerned, it is naïve to assume ‘that law reform issues and 
solutions find their way on to the public agenda more or less by magic 
because (a) an important social problem exists; and (b) the proposed 
solutions are thought to address the problem…[for t]he public agenda is set 
and manipulated by organised interest groups[, and e]lected governments 
adopt policies that maximise their chances of re-election[ and hence 
i]dentifying the power and the political pressure points will often, clarify 
what appear to be irrational definitions of public problems and incoherent 
solutions.’106 
 
 
VIII ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT GENERAL DAMAGES REGIME 
 IN VICTORIA 
 
 A Overview of the case against the existing regime 
 
Given this author’s unfavourable evaluation of the reform as a whole, it 
follows that a similar view would be reached with the changes concerning 
general damages. With the three aims of ‘legislative “reform” of the common 
law tort of negligence…[being] to reduce the cost of legal proceedings; 
reduce the number of frivolous claims for minor injuries; and to cap the size 
of large claims’,107 a number of unprincipled, inconsistent consequences arise 
from existing laws related primarily to threshold, cap and assessment of non-
economic loss. It is paradoxical for John Lenders, the Finance Minister of 
Victoria to have said on record that ‘[t]hese reforms have been a success. 
They were designed to restore confidence to the insurance industry and to the 
people's ability to sue.’108 Whilst it is obvious that the reform has been a 
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success for the insurance industry, it is not clear how his comment on the 
reform restoring confidence to the people’s ability to sue bears any 
resemblance to reality. 
 
An important point on principle to note is that as Bob Gotterson has said, 
‘It’s also worth noting that what may be a “trivial” amount to one person is 
not necessarily “trivial” to another.’109 But fundamentally the questions 
which Victorians and majority of Australians have been confronted with 
since the beginning of the reform are: 
 
Should there be full compensation for the loss sustained or should 
there be partial compensation pursuant to statutory limits? Is there a 
sound case for the introduction of thresholds and/or caps on the 
damages recoverable for the loss…?110 
 
One school of thought is that ‘[m]oney by definition cannot restore non-
pecuniary loss[ and hence s]ome would argue for the outright abolition of 
non-pecuniary damages.’111 It is cited as support for the contention that 
‘[m]ost compensation schemes [in Canada] ignore or limit recovery under 
this head”112 and “pain and suffering type harms are largely ignored in the US 
by a wide range of other compensation mechanisms.’113 
 
On the other hand, this author believes that ‘restrictions on the right to 
recover full compensation for loss…[are] entirely unsupported by principle[ 
as w]hatever the nature of the threshold and/or cap introduced it will be 
utterly arbitrary and artificial[ and]...plaintiffs are no longer treated as 
individuals but as a homogenous group.’114 As a result, ‘[a]ttention shifts 
from what has actually been lost by the plaintiff injured to what is thought by 
the government of the day to be reasonable by reference to some notional 
standard.’115 In the final analysis, ‘[a]rbitrary and artificial limits are not, of 
course, unknown in the law, but they should be avoided wherever possible. 
Certainly they should be avoided where the basis for their introduction is 
highly questionable and it is clear that they will operate in an unfair or 
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prejudicial manner.’116 It is an understatement by Chief Justice Spigelman of 
New South Wales, that ‘the introduction of caps on recovery and thresholds 
before recovery - an underwriter driven, not a principled change - has led to 
considerable controversy.’117  
 
It is interesting to note that Sugarman’s suggestions on damages law reform 
are remarkably similar to those implemented by a large number of Australian 
governments. His primary justifications are also very much akin to those used 
by the Federal Government in that: 
 
Potential social gains of ridding the system of a giant share of current 
claims are very large[ with]…prospect of large savings in legal costs 
and payouts, as well as the reduced burden on the administration of 
the judicial system[ and]…prospect of overturning the 
widespread…social norm that suing somebody else when you are 
hurt in an accident is what everyone does and what you are culturally 
expected to do118[, and]…[a] much greater share of the damages 
awarded in tort would go to fill genuine need, and more of the total 
payout would go to the more seriously injured.119 
 
In essence his argument is based on American pragmatism with the idea that 
the means are justifiable by the end. It is lamentable that the Australian legal 
system has imported such values from the United States of America rather 
than commendable features of her legal system. But even at a pragmatic 
level, his contention is shallow to the extent that: 
 
The introduction of thresholds does not remove the cost of injury to 
the community. What they do is cause the cost to be shifted from the 
wrongdoer to the injured person and the community at large. The 
community suffers, not only because access to justice is denied to 
many, but because of the removal of incentives to maintain high 
levels of safety to avoid injury and because of increased taxation 
necessary to fund to hospital, medical and social welfare expenses no 
                                                 
116 Ibid. 
117 Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘The New Liability Structure in Australia’ 
(Speech delivered at the Swiss Re Liability Conference, Sydney, 14 September 
2004). 
118 Sugarman, above n 3, 516. 
119 Ibid, 524. 
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longer met by tortfeasors. Caps on damages give rise to similar 
problems.120 
 
Indeed as an example of the phenomenon predicted by Mullany, it is claimed 
that ‘[t]he costs of caring for injured people have shifted from insurers to the 
public heath system, with a $12 million increase in Medicare costs in NSW 
since the changes to injury compensation laws.’121 It would be interesting to 
compare this amount with the total increase in public and professional 
liability insurance premium in New South Wales during the crisis to see 
whether it may actually be more economical for government to subsidise the 
full extent of the increase on a one-off basis to help businesses and 
organisations to get over the crisis instead of implementing the reform. 
 
Another instance of the arbitrariness of utilitarianism in action in the reform 
is the entitlement to interest on general damages which has been completely 
removed in a number of jurisdictions albeit not Victoria. According to the Ipp 
Panel: 
 
The principle underlying awards of pre-judgement interest is that the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to be compensated arise at the date the cause of 
action is complete. If the plaintiff does not actually receive the 
compensation until some time later, she has been ‘kept out of the’ 
money to which she is entitled, and so should be awarded interest to 
compensate her for not having had the use of the money …damages 
for pre-judgement general damages are calculated according to the 
value of money at the date of judgement. This effectively eliminates 
the need for compensation for being ‘out of the money’.122 
 
If interest is effectively imputed into the award amount at the judgment date, 
it means that victims are entitled to interest which is simply not separately 
itemised, then why does interest on general damages have to be abolished? 
 
An even more illogical reasoning that seems like shedding crocodiles’ tears 
on the part of the Ipp Panel, is that: 
                                                 
120 Mullany, above n 1, 880. 
121 A Fair Go For Injured People, Personal Injury Compensation - Background 
Briefing Paper <http://www.faircompensation.com.au/docs/briefing_paper.pdf> at 
24 November 2006. 
122 Chris Latham and Michael Playford, 'Report to the Insurance Issues Working 
Group of Heads of Treasuries - Actuarial assessment of the recommendations of the 
Ipp Report' (PricewaterhouseCoopers Actuarial Pty Ltd, 2002), 25. 
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There is some irony in the introduction of reforms targeting 
proportionate liability. The Ipp Report declined to recommend its 
introduction in personal injury cases on the grounds that there was a 
risk that plaintiffs would not fully recover their losses.123 
 
If governments are so concerned about the mere risk of victims not fully 
recovering their losses, how do they look the electorate in the eye and tell 
them with a straight face about the imposition of thresholds and caps which 
are measures that not only realise the very risk that governments seem to care 
so much about but fly in the face of the principle of full restitution. 
 
 
 B General damages thresholds 
 
Of all the legislative changes concerning general damages, none is more 
controversial than the imposition of thresholds, and rightly so. The raison 
d'être for thresholds is as follows: 
 
Claims for general damages have traditionally accounted for about 45 
per cent of the total cost of public liability injury claims in the 
$20,000 – $100,000 bracket[ and so]…[i]ntroducing thresholds, it 
was thought, would significantly reduce the number of smaller 
claims that many believed were behind the hike in insurance 
premiums.124  
 
[Accordingly t]he Federal Government’s Review of the Law of 
Negligence…recommended imposing a threshold for general 
damages based on 15 per cent of a most extreme case…saying that 
such a threshold was ‘an effective and appropriate way of 
significantly reducing the number and cost of smaller claims’.125 
 
The Federal Government’s justification seems to lie with the first Trowbridge 
Consulting report in which it is stated that: 
 
Introducing a threshold/deductible for general damages equivalent to, 
say, $20,000 would be unlikely to have the potential to reduce claims 
costs by any more than 10% and for any savings to be sustainable 
would need to – 
                                                 
123 Morgan and Skinner, above n 24, 7. 
124 Law Council of Australia, above n 15, 1. 
125 Ditto. 
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• prevent erosion of the deductible itself (as occurred in the NSW 
scheme) through increasing general damages awards for more 
minor injuries 
 
• prevent leakage of compensation from general damages to future 
earning capacity (economic loss buffers).126 
 
According to the second Trowbridge Consulting report, ‘[f]rom work done in 
NSW CTP, we believe a 10% permanent impairment threshold may equate 
roughly to a $40,000 to $50,000 general damages amount (although it may be 
lower in Victoria).’127 Therefore it would seem from Table 1 that the 
Victorian threshold equates to about A$20,000 in monetary terms and the 
potential effect on claims costs would be comparatively low in relation to the 
rise in insurance premium in the wake of the crisis. 
 
Gotterson also asserts that: 
 
The argument for imposing thresholds is based on a belief that if we 
can limit the number of smaller claims, then insurance premiums will 
drop. But if claim numbers drop, there is no guarantee that insurers 
will pass on their cost savings in the form of reduced premiums to 
organisations or individuals…128 
 
His view is shared by the Law Council which ‘does not believe there is 
satisfactory evidence that restricting the availability of damages for non-
economic loss will reduce insurance premiums.”129 At the same time 
“underwriters are cautious of reducing premiums…while their liability is 
unclear under policies with very long liability tails.’130 But as far as this 
author is concerned, even if insurers reduce their premium by the full 10 per 
cent as predicted by Trowbridge Consulting under the best case scenario, 
such ‘benefit’ in no way validates thresholds which are objectionable at both 
conceptual and operational levels. 
 
At the conceptual level, thresholds are unethical for the following reasons: 
 
                                                 
126 Pearson and Atkins, above n 87, 53. 
127 Atkins and Pearson, above n 59, 17. 
128 Law Council of Australia, above n 12, Editorial. 
129 Ibid, Backgrounder – Damages for Noneconomic Loss and Thresholds. 
130 Pelletier, above n 39. 
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To rule out recovery for non-economic loss fails to appropriately 
recognise that personal capacities (like the ability to run and see) and 
mental equilibrium lie at the core of what it is to be human. To many 
victims of negligence the component of their award that compensates 
them for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life is of the 
most significance.(Law Council of Australia)131 
 
Thresholds are used to arbitrarily determine whether a person should 
be compensated for their injuries, without any regard to the impact of 
an injury on a person’s way of life. … This is compounded by the 
inconsistencies between the different thresholds in personal injury 
schemes, which are nonsensical and contrary to community 
expectations.(A Fair Go For Injured People)132 
 
Thresholds do not distinguish between the personal circumstances of 
claimants. For example, they do not differentiate between the loss of a 
finger for a concert pianist as compared to an office clerk (Law 
Council of Australia).133 
 
The most pernicious feature of the legislation is the assumption that 
people with an injury that is less than [a threshold] are suffering from 
only trivial or superficial conditions that do not deserve 
compensation.(McGarvie and Maynard)134 
 
[Ultimately t]hresholds arbitrarily remove common law rights.(Law 
Council of Australia)135 
 
At an operational level, thresholds produce a number of inequitable 
consequences: 
Thresholds meant that a certain level of negligence becomes free 
from financial consequence to the person who is at fault. This risks 
causing safety standards to decrease. (Law Council of Australia)136 
 
                                                 
131 Law Council of Australia, above n 129. 
132 A Fair Go For Injured People, above n 121. 
133 Law Council of Australia, above n 15. 
134 Michael McGarvie and Lisa Maynard, 'Australian Product Liability - The Demise 
of the Everyday Claim' (2006) (73) Precedent 8, 12 
135 Law Council of Australia, above n 129. 
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[T]hresholds allow a certain level of negligence to be “acceptable”. 
But negligence should never be acceptable[ for]…allowing lapses to 
occur in “trivial” cases could lead to catastrophic accidents occurring 
down the track. (Law Council of Australia)137 
  
Thresholds diminish the incentive for risk management. (Law 
Council of Australia)138 
 
[R]eductions on eligibility to compensation…do nothing to improve 
the taking of personal responsibility by persons at risk of having 
accidents. They simply relieve costs for defendants – in fact reduce 
the need for them to take responsibility. (North)139 
 
Thresholds not only eliminate so-called “trivial” claims, they remove 
the entitlement to compensation for all claims below the threshold. 
Depending on the level of threshold, many of these claims would not 
be considered ‘trivial’. (Law Council of Australia)140 
 
Thresholds on non-economic loss have a greater impact on stay at 
home mothers and fathers, the elderly, unemployed and children. For 
people such as these whose claims for economic loss (that is, earning 
capacity) are usually lower than for full-time workers, the loss of 
non-economic damages can make it practically impossible to bring a 
claim at all, even if theoretically there would be an entitlement to be 
reimbursed for medical expenses. (Law Council of Australia)141 
 
[T]he exclusion of pain and suffering compensation for persons 
under a threshold (such as a permanent impairment level, or a 
percentage of the worst case), can effectively end (by making it 
uncommercial to pursue) a claim for persons whose claims are 
largely for non-economic loss[ such as one]…involving less serious 
injuries (and so not requiring large medical or future care costs 
awards), [or] by people who are not in the paid workforce (and so do 
not have economic loss). (Heinrich)142 
                                                 
137 Law Council of Australia, above n 21, Sample Letter to an MP. 
138 Law Council of Australia, above n 129. 
139 North, above n 32, 9. 
140 Law Council of Australia, above n 15. 
141 Law Council of Australia, above n 129. 
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Thresholds also discourage rehabilitation and recovery. This is 
because, under thresholds, it is in the interest of the injured person to 
remain impaired rather than take steps, such as treatment or 
rehabilitation, to improve. (Law Council of Australia)143 
 
Insurers will chose to use the impairment thresholds in borderline 
cases to negotiate a discounted settlement. (Radloff, Saxton and 
Triantopoulos)144 
 
Thresholds have a cost shifting effect in that expenses incurred by the 
injured person are shifted in part (or in whole) from the negligent 
person onto the injured person, their family and/or the entire 
community via the health and social security systems. Accordingly, 
cost shifting can only save the community an expense if the 
consequences of the injury are borne entirely by the individual 
injured. To the extent any of the cost leaks to the social security and 
health systems, then the effect is to shift costs from the insurance 
pool to the public purse. It is only fair to expect that the full burden 
of liability and cost of injury be borne by the one responsible for the 
injury (generally through their public liability insurance policy). The 
burden should not be subsidised by the community or the accident 
victim. To do so, in the Law Council’s view, offends a deeply held 
sense of fairness in the Australian community, which is reflected in 
the common law, namely: that the wrongdoer should pay for his or 
her acts or omissions. (Law Council of Australia)145 
 
To top it off, given all the above unjust outcomes, there is ‘no suggestion that 
the introduction of a threshold be accompanied with a counterbalancing 
benefit scheme’.146 
 
Despite the overwhelming reasons listed above for rejecting thresholds, 
Sugarman has put forward some scenarios that favour imposing thresholds 
such as: 
 
Victims have “no ongoing pain and suffering” or what they feel may 
“have been very temporary”.147 
                                                 
143 Law Council of Australia, above n 15. 
144 Radloff, Saxton and Triantopoulos, above n 27, 8. 
145 Law Council of Australia, above n 129. 
146 Mullany, above n 1, 879. 
147 Sugarman, above n 3, 515. 
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Victims exploit the “nuisance value” in terms of “defendants” needs 
to get the claims off their books.148 
 
[D]evious victims…[run] up unneeded care costs, to manufacture 
ailments…149 
 
He goes on to suggest that ‘combining a threshold on pain and suffering 
awards with a reversal of the collateral source rule means that the tort system 
would shift its focus towards the more seriously injured.’150 Again, this 
author finds his contingent claims to be unpersuasive to say the least. First, 
however transient is the pain and suffering experienced, it does not alter the 
fact that a victim has suffered and therefore is entitled to general damages. 
Secondly, ‘nuisance value’ is not universal and from the perspective of a 
victim, it may well be argued that the real ‘nuisance value’ in the first place is 
the need for a victim to pursue the claim for general damages after already 
having been injured. But ultimately this notion of ‘nuisance value’ is of little 
bearing, for the issue is whether the defendant is at fault and if so then the 
‘nuisance value’ may be considered as part of the penalty for the wrongdoing. 
Thirdly, any potential or actual abuse of a system or process does not excuse 
‘throwing out the baby with the bath water’ as the saying goes. Does it follow 
that because a legal system is open to abuse, citizens are not entitled to 
pursue their legal rights? Finally, a case based on sugar-coated utilitarianism 
does not answer the questions of by whom and what is one to determine the 
degree of seriousness in injuries and how such measure has any relevance to 
the award and assessment of general damages. 
 
 
 C Assessment of general damages 
 
As shown by Table 1, Victoria and a number of states and territories have 
adopted the degree of impairment as a proxy of the extent of non-economic 
loss and thus the amount of general damages to be awarded. Of course the 
most unprincipled element of such an approach is that there is no obvious 
logical connection between the first two aforementioned variables to warrant 
the former being an approximation of the latter. 
 
The injury assessment approach is also often criticised for being invalid since 
‘[t]o assess an injured person’s level of “whole person impairment” and their 
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149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                             VOLUME 10 NO 2 162
entitlement to fair compensation, the…Government adopted the American 
Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” 
(‘AMA Guides’) [and t]his was despite advice in “the Guides” themselves 
that the “criteria should not be used to make financial awards or direct 
estimates of disabilities”’.151 The uncertainty in assessment results is also a 
bane in using the AMA Guides as elaborated herewith by way of examples: 
 
The loss of a fallopian tube in a pre-menopausal woman is assessed 
between 0% and 15% whole person impairment. Whether such an 
injury is above or below 5% will be unavoidably arbitrary as the 
Guides offer little help to the doctor making the assessment. Clearly, 
the insufficiency of the Guides was recognised by the government, as 
they have made some exceptions for cases involving loss of a breast 
or foetus. If the Guides were adequate…, such exceptions would not 
be necessary. Nevertheless, the exceptions have brought their own 
arbitrariness: a mother may be compensated if her baby is stillborn as 
a result of negligence but not if her baby was born alive but dies a 
few days later as a result of mismanagement of the labour.152 
 
Additionally there are a number of other anomalies with the whole injury 
assessment approach:  
 
[An] unfortunate effect of impairment thresholds is the inability 
when assessing impairment to take any account of the subjective 
impact of an injury on a person’s way of life.153 
 
[In contrast, as an example,] permanent pain and suffering is 
conventionally determined by taking into account the future life 
expectancy of the victim — ie, the number of years of suffering that 
lie ahead.154 
 
Some examples of injuries that would not qualify for non-economic 
loss damages under the new regime will be: Loss of taste 3 per cent 
(AMA4) … Loss of sense of smell 3 per cent (AMA4)155 
 
                                                 
151 A Fair Go For Injured People, above n 121. 
152 Kathryn Booth and Jacob Varghese, 'The Rush to Law Reform in Personal 
Injuries' (2003) 28(5) Alternative Law Journal 210, 210-211. 
153 Bugg, above n 5, 10. 
154 Sugarman, above n 3, 514. 
155 Lombard and McGarvie, above n 31, 4. 
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[P]eople most disadvantaged by impairment thresholds are those who 
suffer serious injury as a result of negligence, but have no permanent 
impairment. This is because the Guides only recognise injuries that 
are permanent. Yet surgical errors…which may require multiple 
operations to repair, extensive hospitalisation and long-term 
debilitation, will not always result in a permanent impairment. Other 
cases may involve a serious departure from the standard of care but 
will provide limited legal redress for the patient involved…156 
 
Most of the everyday injuries that arise out of the use of defective 
household and domestic equipment are not catastrophic. In fact, they 
don't often produce injuries which would fall into the category of 
15% of a most extreme case.157 
 
The Committee received a submission that asserted that recent 
amendments made to the Wrongs Act 1958 (‘Act’), may discriminate 
against people with psychiatric disabilities. … The threshold level for 
psychiatric impairment is 10 per cent, while the threshold for other 
types of impairment is 5 per cent. … The Committee notes that there 
is no reference to the reason for the differential treatment of different 
types of injury in the Second Reading Speech. The Committee notes 
that there are also different threshold requirements for non-economic 
loss between psychiatric and physical injuries in the Accident 
Compensation Act 1985, but that there is no distinction in the 
Transport Accident Act 1986.158 
 
[U]nless a parent can show an ongoing psychiatric impairment of 
greater than 10%, an extremely high threshold, no claim will arise 
from the death of a child, no matter how serious the negligence.159 
 
[P]sychiatric and psychological injury arising as a consequence of the 
physical injury is excluded from the assessment. This is generally 
known as ‘secondary psychological injury’.160  
 
                                                 
156 Booth and Varghese, above n 152, 211. 
157 McGarvie and Maynard, above n 134, 11. 
158 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Parliament of Victoria, 
Discrimination in the Law: Inquiry under Section 207 of the Equal Opportunity Act 
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This is contrasted with direct psychological injury which is included in the 
assessment. This author contends that such distinction is unjust where the 
secondary psychological injury is caused but for the physical injury. 
 
A further criticism is that there is ‘[a] lack of accountability… because 
judgements made about the level of impairment are made by bureaucratic 
authorities and their doctors [and as a result]… there is limited scope to test 
these findings or to take into account the views of treating doctors or 
specialists (.i.e. doctors who have in-depth knowledge of their patient’s 
degree of impairment and trauma).’161 This is often the case with injury 
assessment for motor vehicle and work accidents, which is administered by 
individual statutory authorities. The same issue occurs with public liability 
and medical negligence cases in Victoria by virtue of the statutory 
requirements that only certain medical practitioners can conduct assessments 
and reassessments can only be performed by medical panels, with no right of 
appeal, as described in Section V above. It is said that this situation is made 
worse in medical negligence cases as ‘[p]laintiff lawyers already have a 
difficult time finding doctors prepared to criticise the performance of their 
peers[ and g]iven the pervasive anti-litigation attitude of the medical 
profession, bias and the perception of bias is inevitable when medical panels 
assess injuries in medical negligence claims’.162 
 
 
 D Caps on general damages 
 
As explained above in sub-section A of this Part , caps are just as 
unprincipled as thresholds. However, it is the Federal Government’s rationale 
for its adoption that portrays a blatant effort to not only justify the means the 
end but to indeed cut off the nose to spite the face. 
It is acknowledged by the insurance industry and actuaries that: 
 
Large damages awards are not a significant cause of rising premiums 
and that, consequently, capping awards will not solve that 
problem.163 
 
It is clear from the material and from our general knowledge of large 
awards for personal injury claims that a cap on general damages is 
unlikely to have any material impact on current claims costs unless 
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set at a very low level (say $100,000) and accompanied by 
proportionate scaling below this level…164 
 
Despite such opinions the Federal Government champions for the 
introduction of caps for they ‘are not, in themselves, cost reduction measures 
but are designed to improve greater stability and enable consistent calculation 
of general damages amounts below the cap…’165 Thus the ‘major direct 
effect of any cap… is to cut back on what the most seriously injured victims 
can be awarded [in order to]… have the effect of forcing a downward 
adjustment of pain and suffering awards… throughout the full range of 
harms…’166 
 
A cascading effect from the imposition of caps and thresholds is the scale in 
between the two ends, which although is not applicable to Victoria, is 
nonetheless worth mentioning as a number of other jurisdictions have 
implemented a sliding scale regime which is arbitrary when compared with a 
proportional scale. It is contended that: 
 
A strictly proportional scale is, in our view, not appropriate. … If a 
proportional scale is adopted there is likely to be significant pressure 
placed upon the threshold by claimants who are at a level slightly 
below the 15% mark. … This is because benefits are significant just 
above the threshold, creating an incentive for claimants to inflate the 
severity of their claim. This “bracket creep” is likely to erode the 
threshold. Bracket creep is less likely under the sliding scale as only 
quite small benefits are available just above the threshold.167 
 
Another inconsistency identified is that: 
 
While damages for non-economic losses for personal injury have 
been capped, there is currently no statutory cap on the amount that 
can be awarded for such losses in defamation law.168 
 
Whilst any cap amount is subjective by nature, there is further concern 
regarding its adequacy. At least in relation to personal injury in product 
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liability cases (but there is no reason why the same issue is irrelevant to other 
negligence liability areas), it is asserted that: 
 
The least obvious vice in this limit on damages is the statutory 
maximum. In 15 or 20 years' time, that maximum will be 
unacceptably low compared to the then community standards for 
damages for pain and suffering being awarded by courts in 
catastrophic cases. … Despite the existence of CPI increases under 
the TPA, significant erosion of the remedy will tragically compound 
the most extreme injuries suffered in defective product accidents 
within a decade or two.169 
 
It is perhaps for the above reasons that the Holy Grail of the reform has not 
been attained for according to the Ipp Panel: 
 
In no area is the law more diverse, and (we are convinced) in no area 
is conformity more desirable, than in regard to the quantum of 
damages.170  
 
It is also for the above reasons that this author cannot agree with Feldthusen’s 
comment that ‘The suggested cap on general damages is comparable to the 
common law cap adopted in Canada 25 years ago. On the whole, these 
suggestions are sensible’.171 Just because another country has capped its 
general damages award does not make the implementation in Australia of the 
same any more principled. 
 
 
E Implications for product liability on personal 
injuries 
 
This author has already mentioned in Section VIII above the absurdity of the 
changes of tort reform going beyond the law of negligence. The changes 
affected by the Federal Government to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
represent a concrete example of the desperateness of the reform. As Boyd has 
said: 
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A claim for damages for personal injury under the TPA is not a claim 
for damages for personal injury resulting from negligence. The 
concepts of negligence do not equate with the elements of the 
statutory causes of action under the TPA. … Despite the panel's 
reference to 'negligently caused', the panel clearly meant to express 
its desire to avoid disparity in outcomes between negligence and 
other causes of action such as those based on the TPA…172 
 
The unjust outcomes of the changes in this area of the law are: 
 
Destruction, of real consumer rights for small -to medium-sized 
claims…173  
 
Effectively, it creates two classes under the TPA. Business can obtain 
remedies under the TPA fully for all economic loss, whilst 
consumers are limited if they suffer personal injury or death as a 
result of improper conduct.174 
 
It is yet another example of the reform being cutting the nose to spite the face 
for the ad hoc changes plastered to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) have 
undone the progress made in consumer protection. This is because: 
 
In Victoria, some have been advised to consider negligence actions 
under the new Wrongs Act. But … [a]n action in negligence would 
mean not relying on the more simplified strict liability provisions of 
Part VA of the TPA. … It would also mean that plaintiffs would have 
to return to the bad old days of a paper chase, trying to identify the 
supplier, importer, manufacturer, retailer or another link in the 
production-and-supply chain that might be said to have acted 
negligently in producing the defective product. The consumer would 
then have to make the difficult and risky choice of identifying who in 
the supply line is blameworthy and whom to sue. … The unfair 
balance tipped against injured individuals by the product liability 
laws that pre-existed Part VA in 1992 will return if most everyday 
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consumer injuries can be dealt with only in the common law courts 
rather than under the TPA.175 
 
 
IX  CONCLUSION 
 
The overall effect of the existing regime for individuals is, in a nutshell, 
unfair for: 
 
Many genuine victims of negligence, who have suffered personal 
injury, are uncompensated or are not being adequately compensated 
because of the thresholds and caps on damages that were 
established.176 
 
Claimants can be left in a position where, because of the reduction in 
entitlement for pain and suffering compensation, it is not 
economically practical for them to pursue a claim, even if at law they 
would be entitled to compensation for economic loss or medical 
expenses. That is why…their right to claim for medical expenses and 
economic loss can be illusory.177 
 
If the injured person went to a public hospital, or if he or she was 
treated on a weekend, there would be no other recoverable costs such 
as medical expenses or lost wages.178 
 
Although economic loss may still be claimed, few plaintiffs will be 
willing to proceed with litigation unless there is a real prospect for 
general damages or economic costs are very high.179 
It does mean that some people who are quite seriously injured are not 
able to sue at all. More than any other factor I envisage this 
restriction will be seen as much too restrictive.180 
 
At a community level, the effect of reform is also said to be negative for: 
 
                                                 
175 McGarvie and Maynard, above n 134, 12-13. 
176 Pelletier, above n 39. 
177 North, above n 32, 8. 
178 Caspar Conde, 'The Foresight Saga - Risk, Litigiousness and Negligence Law 
Reforms' (2004) 20(3) Policy 28, 31. 
179 Booth and Jacob Varghese, above n 152, 210. 
180 Spigelman, above n 117. 
2007                                                                            Damages for Personal Injury 169 
The community’s sense of the coherence and the value of the law is 
diminished by inconsistency between underwriter-driven liability 
schemes. … [and] legislated thresholds for the award of damages 
which operate to exclude claims for serious injury devalue our 
common right to personal security.181 
 
Therefore this author finds the following quotation a bemusing yet fitting 
verdict on the Victorian reform: 
 
[T]he term tort reform implies that caps and other limitations on 
injured plaintiff's recovery improve the functioning of the…civil 
justice system. In reality, applying the word reform to those 
restrictions is as misleading as referring to nuclear weapons as 
‘peace-keepers’.182 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON THE  
AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES ACROSS AUSTRALIA 
 
Elements Cth Vic NSW 
Name of the 
Act(s) 
Trade Practices 
(Personal Injuries 
and Death) Act 
2004 
Trade Practices 
Amendment 
(Personal Injuries 
and Death) Act 
2006 
• Wrongs and 
Other Acts 
(Public 
Liability 
Insurance 
Reform) Act 
2002 
• Wrongs and 
Limitation of 
Actions Acts 
(Insurance 
Reform) Act 
2003 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 
Threshold 
on damages 
15 per cent of a 
most extreme case 
except for damages 
A significant injury 
of the following: 
whole person 
15 per cent of a 
most extreme case 
                                                 
181 Submission to the Legislative Council Standing Committee, Parliament of New 
South Wales, Sydney, 10 March 2005, 3.2.5. 
182 Cappa, Forrest, Hinchy and Nase, above n, 215. 
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for non-smoking 
related personal 
injury or death 
arising from 
contravention of 
provisions relating 
to unfair practices 
such as misleading 
or deceptive 
conduct or false or 
misleading 
representations 
impairment 
(‘WPI’) of more 
than five per cent; 
loss of a foetus; 
loss of a breast; 
hearing loss of 
more than five per 
cent; 
permanent 
psychiatric 
impairment of 
more than 10 per 
cent (but not 
psychiatric and 
psychological 
injury arising from 
a physical injury), 
unless the fault is 
sexual assault or 
misconduct, or an 
intentional act to 
cause injury. 
Injury 
assessment 
approach 
Judicial assessment 
in which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
Medical 
assessment based 
on: 
Physical injuries – 
4th edition of the 
American Medical 
Association Guides 
to the Evaluation of 
Permanent 
Impairment. 
Psychiatric injuries 
- The Clinical 
Guidelines to the 
Rating of 
Psychiatric 
Impairment 
prepared by the 
Medical Panel 
(Psychiatry) 
Melbourne, in 
October 1997. 
Judicial assessment 
in which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
Damages 
assessment 
approach 
Common law 
principles 
Common law 
principles 
Common law 
principles 
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Calculation 
of damages 
to be 
awarded 
A graduated scale 
for injuries 
between 15 per 
cent and 32 per 
cent of a most 
extreme case. 
From 33 per cent 
till 100 per cent of 
a most extreme 
case, the amount of 
damaged awarded 
is the same 
percentage of the 
cap on damages. 
Courts may have 
reference to 
previous court 
decisions. 
From 15 per cent to 
33 per cent, a fixed 
percentage of the 
maximum. 
 
Courts may have 
reference to 
previous court 
decisions. 
Cap on 
damages 
A$250,000 indexed 
annually to CPI. 
A$371,380 indexed 
annually to 
Melbourne CPI. 
A$350,000 indexed 
to AWE for NSW. 
Interest on 
damages 
No Yes No 
 
 
Elements Qld SA WA 
Name of the 
Act(s) 
Civil Liability Act 
2003 
Wrongs (Limitation 
and Damages for 
Personal Injury) 
Amendment Act 
2002 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 
Threshold 
on damages 
No Seven days of 
significant 
impairment to 
victim’s ability to 
lead a normal life 
or A$2750 medical 
expenses 
reasonably incurred 
due to the injury. 
A$12,000 indexed 
to the Wage Cost 
Index for WA. 
Injury 
assessment 
approach 
Generally WPI 
with latitude in 
assessment 
methods provided 
methodological 
details are 
provided, but 
courts are to prefer 
assessments 
Judicial assessment 
in which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
Judicial assessment 
in which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
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according to the 
fifth edition of the 
AMA guidelines 
all injuries other 
than scarring and 
mental disorders. 
Damages 
assessment 
approach 
Statute-based on a 
100-point scale of 
Injury Scale Value 
(“ISV”) on the 
degree of injury 
with reference to a 
guide on particular 
ranges of ISV for 
162 types of 
injuries along with 
rules on applying 
those ranges, and 
ISV attributed to 
similar injuries in 
prior proceedings. 
Statute-based 
according to a 
numerical scale 
between zero and 
60 reflecting 60 
equal gradations of 
non economic loss 
from not severe 
enough to justify 
damages to the 
gravest possible 
kind. 
Common law 
principles 
Calculation 
of damages 
to be 
awarded 
Formula with ISV 
at the lower end of 
the injury scale 
worth 
exponentially less 
than those at the 
higher end. 
No damages for 
loss of consortium/ 
servitium (loss of 
comfort/services) 
where general 
damages are less 
than A$30,000. 
Numerical value 
corresponds to a 
dollar figure fixed 
by reference to an 
indexed sliding 
scale skewed so 
that damages for 
minor injuries are 
much less than 
damages for 
serious injuries, but 
subject to 
deductible of the 
same amount as 
threshold. 
Damages amount 
between A$12,000 
and A$36,500 is 
subject to 
A$12,000 
deductible whereas 
that greater than 
$36,500 but less 
than $48,500 is 
$12,000 less 
(damages assessed 
minus  
$36,500). 
Courts may have 
reference to 
previous court 
decisions. 
Cap on 
damages 
A$250,000 A$241,500 indexed 
annually to 
Adelaide CPI. 
Nil 
Interest on 
damages 
No No Yes 
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Elements Tas ACT NT 
Name of the 
Act(s) 
Civil Liability Act 
2002 
The Civil Law 
(Wrongs) 
Amendment Act 
2003 (No 2) 
Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 
2003 
Threshold on 
damages 
A$4000 indexed 
annually to Hobart 
CPI. 
No Permanent 
impairment of five 
per cent of the 
whole person. 
Injury 
assessment 
approach 
Judicial 
assessment in 
which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
Judicial assessment 
in which the judge 
hearing the case 
makes the 
assessment. 
Medical 
assessment based 
on the AMA guide 
to permanent 
impairment 
Damages 
assessment 
approach  
Common law 
principles 
Common law 
principles 
Statute-based 
according to the 
degree of 
permanent 
impairment. 
Calculation 
of damages 
to be 
awarded 
Subject to 
deductible which 
is the same amount 
as threshold but 
reduces according 
to a sliding scale to 
zero when awards 
of damages reach 
A$20 000 which is 
indexed to Hobart 
CPI. Courts may 
have reference to 
previous court 
decisions. 
Courts may have 
reference to 
previous court 
decisions. 
A sliding scale for 
five per cent to 15 
per cent permanent 
impairment of the 
whole person. 
From 33 per cent 
till 100 per cent, 
the amount of 
damaged awarded 
is the same 
percentage of the 
cap on damages. 
Cap on 
damages 
Nil Nil A$350 000 indexed 
to AWE for NT. 
Interest on 
damages 
Yes Yes No 
 
